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On 29 April 2009 the European Commission pub-
lished for consultation a proposal for a Directive on
Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM;
European Commission 2009).The stated objective of
the proposal1 is to establish “common requirements
governing the authorisation and supervision of
AIFM in order to provide a coherent approach to
the related risks and their impact on investors and
markets in the Community”.2 In substantive terms,
the proposal sought to give effect to concerns
expressed at the highest level3 in the wake of the
global financial crisis about the potency of the EU’s
regulatory and supervisory frameworks in the alter-
native investments field and, in particular, about the
perceived lack of regulation and supervision of non-
harmonised funds and their managers.The proposal
has drawn criticism from Europe’s alternative
investment fund (AIF) sector and beyond: some
found it to be sweeping and unduly intrusive; others
considered it too weak and ambiguous. This paper
provides a summary of what has become a contro-
versial proposal, highlighting its strengths and weak-
nesses and proposing ways in which it can be turned
around to better achieve its objectives.
Outline of the draft directive
The draft directive captures all EU-domiciled
AIFM,whether natural or legal persons,irrespective
of the legal domicile of their funds.AIFM managing
small portfolios worth less than EUR 100 million or
less than EUR 500 (for non-leveraged funds with no
redemption rights over a period of five years after
their constitution) are exempted on a de minimis
basis.4 Significantly,while the draft directive seeks to
regulate managers rather than funds, it will affect
both, as several of its provisions relate, more or less
directly, to the funds themselves.
Under the proposal, only authorised, EU-domiciled
AIFM are to be allowed to offer their services and
market their funds to professional5 investors within
the bloc. Benefiting from the proposal’s “European
passport”, duly authorised fund managers may mar-
ket their funds and offer their services not only in
their home jurisdiction but, also, in other EU mem-
ber states,subject only to a notification requirement.
The proposal imposes upon AIFM a wide range of
transparency and information-reporting require-
ments, vis-à-vis investors and regulators; some of
these requirements are of general applicability,while
others depend on the type of fund.The proposal also
lays down detailed rules on the organisation and
operating conditions of AIFM and on the regulation,
by the Commission and/or the competent national
authorities, of their use of leverage.
Under the proposal, EU-domiciled AIFM are to be
allowed to market funds established in third coun-
tries at the earliest three years after the expiry of the
draft directive’s entry into force, provided that the
Commission has assessed their home jurisdiction’s
regulatory and supervisory arrangements as “equiv-
alent”to those of the draft directive,that access con-
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1 The public consultation period lasted less than six weeks, despite
the guidelines stating that consultations should be open for “at
least 8 weeks”.
2 European Commission 2009, Recital 2.
3 The reference is to the European Parliament’s Rasmussen and
Lehne Reports; to the findings of the de Larosière Group; and,
more recently, to the Commission Communication of 27 May 2009
on European Financial Supervision.
4 Managers falling below the directive’s de minimis thresholds may
voluntarily opt into its scheme.
5 The professional-investors-only scope of the draft directive harks
back to pre-financial crisis discussions on a possible harmonisation
of the private placement regimes of the member states. As retail
investors already have access, in several member states, to certain
types of funds, draft Article 32 provides that member states may
allow retail investor access to AIFs, subject to the fulfilment of
stricter,non-discriminatory regulatory requirements on the fund or
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ditions for EU-domiciled funds to the relevant third
country fund’s jurisdiction have been deemed com-
parable to those to be established under the draft
directive and that cooperation agreements are in
place between the home fund’s jurisdiction and the
member state where this is to be marketed,to ensure
the exchange of supervisory and tax-related infor-
mation. In the meantime member states may allow
EU-domiciled AIFMs to market third country funds
to professional investors in their territory subject to
their own national laws.
Finally, the proposal requires member state compe-
tent authorities to cooperate for the exchange of the
macro-prudential data necessary for the AIF sector’s
effective oversight.6
Why the draft directive counts
AIFs,in general,and hedge funds,in particular,have
in recent years grown dramatically in terms of their
assets under management and their overall econom-
ic importance. According to recent estimates
(Persson 2009), no fewer than 1,785 private equity
firms were in operation within the EU in 2009, with
the private equity and hedge fund sectors generating
EUR 9 billion in tax revenues in 2008; moreover,
only the hedge fund and private equity sectors di-
rectly employed 40,000 people across Europe in
2008 (of whom 18,000 in the UK); finally, EU-based
private equity firms invested no less than EUR
51 billion in European companies, only in 2008. It
follows that,although AIFs are relatively small com-
pared to harmonised funds,whose assets under man-
agement amounted to EUR 4,788 billion at the end
of 2009 or 75 percent of the European investment
fund market (EFAMA 2009), they are far from
insignificant. On the wider socio-economic benefits
associated with AIFs,suffice it to note that their con-
tributions to market efficiency (through the proac-
tive use of their shareholder rights and their input
to price discovery), liquidity (especially at times
of acute liquidity shortages), financial stability
(through the spreading and diversification of risk)
and the financing of pension systems are widely
recognised, despite the tendency to place greater
emphasis, in the public debate surrounding them, on
the externalities justifying concerns about their
activities rather than on their benefits (Athanassiou
2009, 91–98).
The  contribution of AIFM and AIFs to the creation
of investment opportunities and jobs as well as their
role in the financial system suggest that Community
legal rules of relevance to the alternative asset man-
agement sector,however necessary or desirable their
introduction, need to be the products of mature
reflection, as such rules have the potential, if dispro-
portionate, imbalanced or otherwise ill-considered,
to damage the sector’s growth prospects, depriving
several Europeans of their livelihood and Europe’s
financial markets of their competitiveness and inves-
tors of profitable investment opportunities.
Benefits of the draft directive
The Commission’s aspiration to extend, through the
draft directive, “appropriate regulation and over-
sight to all actors and activities that embed signifi-
cant risks”7 is, no doubt, sensible and fair and has
been hailed as such by institutional stake-holders
(ECB 2009, paragraph 3). That normative con-
straints making compulsory the authorisation and
supervision of funds and/or their managers only
apply in some member state jurisdictions suggests
that there is room for regulatory intervention in this
field. At least insofar as they affect systemically sig-
nificant types of funds (i.e., large and highly lever-
aged ones),it is likelier than not that the existing reg-
ulatory lacunae can best be filled through concerted,
EU-level action, which has considerable advantages
over segmented,national or over-ambitious but,ulti-
mately, unworkable international action. Moreover,
that AIFs were not at the root of the financial crisis
is hardly a reason to maintain the status quo as it is
difficult to predict where the epicentre of a future
crisis may be or to assess the contribution of AIFs to
exacerbating the economic downturn, inter alia by
creating demand for some of the “sophisticated”
products that were symptomatic of its creation or by
aggravating de-leveraging phenomena in the midst
of the crisis (FSA 2009, 72–73).
Although many of the principles behind the draft
directive are,therefore,sound,where it is possible to
differ with the Commission is on the concrete ways
in which the legitimate objectives underlying the
adoption of EU-wide legislative measures in this
6 At the time of the proposal’s release, thinking had yet not crys-
tallised within the EU on the post-financial crisis supervisory struc-
ture and,in particular,on the creation of the ESRB and the ESMA.
Reflections on this issue had yet to mature at the time of writing. 7 European Commission 2009, Explanatory Memorandum, § 1.1.field are to be achieved as well as on the details of
such measures. Leaving aside, for a moment, the
costs that the draft directive would entail for the AIF
industry and its investors,8 we briefly consider,in the
following section,what some of its other,more “con-
ceptual”, drawbacks are.
Concerns raised by the draft directive
The draft directive raises concerns at various levels.
We will, for the purposes of this paper, only concen-
trate on the following four: (i) the “one size fits all”
approach that permeates much of its text, (ii) its
troubled relationship with existing pieces of EU leg-
islation and the competition concerns to which some
of its provisions give rise (iii) the Commission’s
ambition to regulate, through the draft directive, the
authorisation and marketing, within the EU, of non-
EU domiciled funds and (iv) the draft directive’s
lack of a clear regulatory focus.We briefly examine,
below, each of these concerns.
One of the main points of contention surrounding
the draft directive relates to the, more or less, uni-
form regime that this purports to impose on a wide
range of disparate AIFs, including purely national
funds of no obvious systemic stability relevance,
many of which are already regulated nationally, but
excluding credit institutions or insurance companies
(ECB 2009,paragraph 7).This is despite the fact that
the introduction of an EU-wide regime for the mon-
itoring of the risks posed by funds can be justified
(and not just as a matter of law) in the case of certain
funds only, but not others and that regulatory arbi-
trage should be discouraged9 A closely related (but
distinct) point is that several of the draft directive’s
requirements appear unnecessary or seem to single
out AIFs,despite their horizontal nature (ECB 2009,
paragraph 8). The obligation imposed on all AIFM
to appoint “independent” asset valuation agents, the
requirement for the assets of all AIFs marketed
within the EU to be deposited with an EU-based
external depositary (i.e., a custodian bank) and the
Commission’s prerogative to dictate limits on the
use of leverage by AIFM10 are only some examples
of prescriptions that may concentrate (instead of
mitigating) risks, increasing legal uncertainties and
imposing costs out of proportion with their expected
benefits.
Consistency between the draft directive and several
existing European directives is another source of
concern. By including within the definition of AIF
both open-ended and listed, closed-ended invest-
ment funds,which are already subject to comprehen-
sive regulation under the Markets in Financial In-
struments Directive (MiFID), the Prospectus, the
Transparency and the Market Abuse Directives, or
by, effectively, imposing upon management compa-
nies that simultaneously manage undertakings for
collective investments in transferable securities
(UCITS) and non-UCITS funds a double licensing
requirement, the draft directive introduces elements
of legal uncertainty in an area where clarity is of the
essence. Similarly, by subjecting to more stringent
rules AIFs pursuing activities similar to those of har-
monised funds, the proposal is apt to generate level
playing field concerns. The extra disclosure require-
ments for private equity managers – including the
obligation to comply with the Transparency Direc-
tive – threaten to distort competition since wealthy
individuals or the subsidiaries of multinational cor-
porations (that private equity funds are in competi-
tion with) are not subject to the same requirements.
The draft directive’s ambition to regulate the autho-
risation and marketing, within the EU, of non-EU
domiciled funds is contentious, for two reasons. The
requirements subject to which such authorisation is
to be granted by the competent member state
authorities and the activation of the foreign funds’
marketing possibility no less than three years after
the directive’s entry into force make it unlikely that
non-EU AIFM could obtain such authorisation.
While this approach might be defended for prima
facie being in line with the G-20 Pittsburgh Summit’s
objective of enhancing transparency in offshore
jurisdictions, the restrictions on third country funds
and managers are problematic, both because they
restrict investor choice and because they are in open
conflict with the G-20 London Summit’s call for reg-
ulators and supervisors to “reduce the scope for reg-
ulatory arbitrage” and to “promote global trade and
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8 According to estimates, the directive will cost the private equity
and hedge fund industries in the EU between EUR 1.3 billion and
EUR 1.9 billion in the first year, with the annual recurring cost
being estimated at between EUR 689 million and EUR 985 mil-
lion.The increased compliance costs for all players along the fund
value chain – managers, custodians, administrators and so on – are
likely to be passed on to investors, in the shape of higher fees
(Persson 2009).
9 It is telling that the G20 London Summit recommendations
stressed the need to focus only on the “systemically important
financial institutions, instruments and markets’ including on the
“systemically important hedge funds”.
10 This is only one of a wide range of areas where the Commission
reserves itself a right to modify the directive (others include short-
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investment and reject protectionism”. It is, on the
other hand, questionable whether the passport-dri-
ven opening of the European fund market to off-
shore funds and their managers can be a legitimate
internal market regulation objective.11
Perhaps the greatest defect of the draft directive lies
in its lack of a clear regulatory focus:specifically it is
not clear whether its focus is on financial stability (as
one would expect the case to be,given the timing and
motivation for its drafting) or, instead, on investor
protection. As a regulatory rationale, investor pro-
tection appears to be somewhat inappropriate in the
context of AIFs,especially since the proposal’s scope
is limited to the marketing of funds and to the offer
of the services of AIFM to professional investors
only. Financial stability, on the other hand, appears
to provide a more compelling basis for regulation in
this field. While these two regulatory rationales are
by no means mutually exclusive, their parallel pur-
suit is apt to weaken the directive’s chances of fulfil-
ling either. If the main focus of the proposal is to be
on financial stability it would be sufficient, in order
for systemically relevant funds to be caught, that the
draft directive’s scope be limited to cross-border,
highly leveraged funds with considerable assets un-
der management. If, on the other hand, its main
emphasis is to be on investor protection, some of its
rules for investor disclosure could be reviewed,as they
are currently tailored to the needs of retail,rather than
professional investors.
European Council and Parliament reaction to the
Commission proposal 
The proposal, which is being considered at the time
of writing by the Parliament and the Council and is
to be approved under the co-decision procedure,has
drawn strong criticism from various quarters (e.g.,
Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management
e.V.; Swiss Funds Association; Finansinspektionen
2009).Interestingly enough,both the Parliament and
the Council have presented their own proposals,
which differ considerably in several respects from
that of the Commission but, also, from one another.
The former Swedish Presidency’s compromise pro-
posal was first published on 12 November 2009 (Eu-
ropean Council 2009), while that of the European
Parliament (the Gauzès proposal, named after the
rapporteur responsible for the Parliament’s Draft
Report in this matter) was made available on 23
November 2009 (European Parliament 2009). Both
texts contain numerous amendments to the draft
directive, the sheer volume of which testifies to the
widely shared perception that the Commission pro-
posal was fraught with weaknesses.While neither the
compromise proposal nor the Gauzès proposal rep-
resents the final word of the Council or the
Parliament, respectively, on the issue, a summary of
their main commonalities and differences is deemed
apposite.
Both the compromise proposal and the Gauzès pro-
posal discard the idea that natural persons can act as
AIFM (acknowledging, nonetheless, that self-man-
aged funds would themselves qualify as AIFM);
however, contrary to the Council’s definition of
AIFM,the one proposed by the Parliament provides
that a manager will not qualify as an AIFM unless it
both manages a fund and assumes responsibility for
doing so. The compromise proposal and the Gauzès
proposal also differ in terms of their approach to the
Commission’s de minimis exemptions: these are
retained by the Council (subject to minor amend-
ments) but discarded by the Parliament (subject,
nevertheless, to the application of the principle of
proportionality, to avoid imposing unnecessary bur-
dens on small AIFs).The Council and the Parliament
do not see eye to eye on the issue of the proposed
appointment of an independent valuator for all AIFs
(contrary to the Council, the Parliament favours
retaining it, except for private equity funds) nor on
the proposed limits on the use of leverage by AIFM
(the Council favours restricting the possibility for
the competent member state authorities to impose
limits on leverage and removing the Commission’s
power to set such limits,whilst the Parliament retains
the latter possibility, albeit in exceptional circum-
stances only and subject to prior determination of
the European Securities and Markets Authority).
Issues over which the Council and the Parliament
broadly agree (despite their differences in the de-
tails) are on the need to (i) scrap the proposed EU
passport for non-EU domiciled funds (this is to be
restricted to EU-established AIFs, marketed to pro-
fessional investors by authorised AIFM), (ii) delete
the provisions subject to which non-EU managers
would be entitled to market non-EU domiciled
funds, (iii) ensure that AIFMs apply remuneration
policies and practices consistent with sound and
effective risk management (an issue in connection
11 Rather than restrict the cross-border distribution eligibility of
foreign funds stronger incentives could be given for third country
funds to transfer their domicile to the EU.with which the Commission had tabled no propos-
als) and (iv) relax the original proposal’s depositary
provisions.
Recommendations for an improved draft 
It is suggested that, whatever the fate of the propos-
als presented by the Council and the Parliament and
whatever the initiatives likely to be taken by the new
Spanish Presidency,about which a recent issues note
provides some hints (European Council 2010), the
draft directive’s rules need to be (re)drafted with
certain fundamental principles and objectives in
mind. An EU-wide legal act in this field should, in
this author’s view, seek to achieve the following
objectives:
a) Distinguish between different types of funds,
exempting from the directive’s scope of applica-
tion funds with little or no systemic risk rele-
vance; unless the proposal’s scope of application
is narrowed down to funds considered to raise
systemic instability risks, its rules could prove to
be unworkable.
b) Free up investor choice by dropping protectionist
elements or extra-territorial pretensions; replac-
ing these with a reasonable requirement for “pru-
dential regulation and supervision”in the country
of the establishment of the AIF or AIFM con-
cerned would not only be sufficient but it could
also encourage offshore jurisdictions to step up
prudential controls over funds established in their
territory.
c) Bring the directive’s organisational, investor dis-
closure and reporting requirements in line with its
actual objectives, rather than follow the model of
existing legal acts (e.g., the UCITS Directive,
which caters for a different market and a different
set of public policy concerns).
d) Rationalise discretionary restrictions on specific
investment policies (e.g., limits on leverage or the
extra requirements for private equity firms);
reducing the Commission’s powers to add to or
amend the directive after its adoption would not
only be conducive to greater legal certainty but
could also help guarantee equal treatment of like
cases.
e) Last but not least,readjust the directive’s regulatory
emphasis,clarifying what information AIFM need to
report, whom they need to report it to and for what
purpose; reporting obligations should focus on data
relevant to the monitoring of financial stability, pav-
ing the way for the monitoring tasks of the Eu-
ropean Systemic Risk Board; unless this is done,
there is every probability that an EU-level legal act
in this field may fail to achieve its objectives and,
possibly,risk creating a false impression of oversight.
Concluding remarks
The tight schedule for the draft directive’s prepara-
tion and the conflicting interests that it seeks to
serve have resulted in the Commission producing a
proposal that, however much seeking to serve legiti-
mate goals, is objectionable in some of its details.
While it is more or less clear that an EU-level legal
act is eventually to be adopted in this field,its precise
contents are still open, with no European consensus
in sight on whether the rules proposed by the
Commission should be watered down or reinforced
and,if so,how.An EU-level agreement is unlikely to
be reached before the first half of 2010,in which case
the directive would not come into force before late
2011 or 2012. If our brief analysis of the proposal’s
areas of improvement is anything to go by, its con-
tents appear likely to evolve significantly prior to its
final adoption. One hopes that some of the concerns
raised by the Commission proposal will be addressed
and that its scope of application will be carefully
considered and readjusted. If some, at least, of the
principles and objectives highlighted in this paper
are adhered to, it is likelier than not that, whatever
its precise contents, the final product will come close
to achieving the valid purposes that underlie its
adoption.
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